Return Predictability: The Dual Signaling Hypothesis of Stock Splits

This paper aims to differentiate between optimistic splits and overoptimistic/opportunistic splits. Although markets do not distinguish between these two groups at the split announcement time, optimistic (over-optimistic/opportunistic) splits precede positive (negative) long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Using the calendar month portfolio approach, we show that the zero-investment, ex-ante identifiable, and fully implementable trading strategy proposed in this paper can generate economically and statistically significant positive abnormal returns. Our findings indicate that pre-split earnings management and how it relates to managers’ incentives, is an omitted variable in the studies of post-split long-term abnormal returns

Frenemies: how do financial firms vote on their own kind?

The financial sector is unique in being largely self-governed: the majority of financial firms’ shares are held by other financial institutions. This raises the possibility that monitoring of financial firms is especially undermined by conflicts of interest due to personal and professional links between these firms and their shareholders. To investigate this possibility, we scrutinize the aspect of the financial sector’s self-governance that is directly observable: mutual fund companies’ voting of their peers’ stock. We find that considerations specific to investee firms’ membership in the same industry as their investors do indeed impact voting. This impact is in the direction of supporting the investee’s management. We show that the own-industry effect reduces director efficacy and lowers firm value as a result. We extend our analysis to other financial companies and show that they also tend to vote more favorably when it comes to their peers. Our results suggest that peer support is a corrupting factor in the financial sector’s governance

Standing out from the crowd:Dedicated institutional investors and strategy uniqueness

This paper examines the effect of dedicated institutional investors on firms' strategy uniqueness. We build on the uniqueness paradox where unique strategies are important drivers of economic rent, yet create an information problem whereby CEOs face discounts from the capital market, thus discouraging them from selecting unique strategies. We propose dedicated institutional investors as a partial remedy to the uniqueness paradox. Dedicated institutional investors invest in gaining private information about their investments, devote effort to understanding firms' strategies, and reduce capital market pressure. Thus, dedicated institutional investors can encourage CEOs to pursue more unique strategies. Our empirical results show the positive influence of dedicated institutional investors on strategic uniqueness, which is even stronger when firms operate in industries that are hard to value

Motivated monitoring by institutional investors and firm investment efficiency

We find that motivated monitoring by institutional investors mitigates firm investment inefficiency, estimated by Richardson's (2006) approach. This relation is robust when using the annual reconstitution of the Russell indexes as exogenous shocks to institutional ownership during the period 1995–2015 and after classifying institutional ownership by institution type. We also show that closer monitoring mitigates the problem of both over‐investing free cash flows and under‐investment due to managers’ career concerns. Finally, we document that the effectiveness of the monitoring by institutional investors appears to increase monotonically with respect to the firm's relative importance in their portfolios

Ownership, Activism and Engagement: Institutional Investors as Active Owners

Research Question We research two questions: First, why do some institutional investors operate at a distance from organizations seemingly acting only to “exit” and “trade” shares while others actively engage through various means of “voice”? Second, what processes and behaviour are associated with active ownership? Research Findings/Insights We develop the concept of active ownership by drawing on contrasting theories and images of ownership, identifying antecedents of active ownership and distinguishing between alternative processes of active ownership. Theoretical/Academic Implications Alternative pathways to active ownership contrast the distant, sometimes adversarial nature of shareholder activism with an engaged, collaborative relationship between investors and corporations. Few studies examine active ownership as a process of engagement and mutual exchange between parties taking a generally longer-term perspective towards investment in the firm and its affairs. After modelling active ownership, we develop a research agenda of substantive issues ranging from market and institutional conditions, through investment organization and practice, to board and investor relations. Practitioner/Policy Implications Opening up the multidimensionality of engagement and relations between investors and corporations is crucial to promoting good corporate governance. Policymakers and practitioners require such knowledge when anticipating and developing adjustments to institutions of corporate governance. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved

Learning from your investors: can the geographical composition of institutional investors affect the chance of success in international M&A deals?

We produce new evidence on whether management which is keen to make foreign acquisitions can benefit from consultation with information-intensive institutional investors who have expertise in the target foreign markets. This research suggests that, in such instances, management should recognise the benefit of effective two-way communication before embarking on such costly strategies. Consistent with theoretical literature, we propose that this can be explained by the fact that complex valuation information is dispersed among many economic agents and management may only have limited access to such data. This research shows that the likelihood of both cross-border deal completion and medium-term cross-border deal success through time depends upon management learning from and getting the support of key institutional investors with regional (foreign) expertise. The theoretical information economics model presented by Dye and Sridhar in 2002 states that the information flow between management and capital markets should be viewed as two way. This study offers empirical evidence in support of their theory. This study offers insights into the positive effect of establishing a proactive investor relations programme for the recruitment of dedicated foreign institutional investors before embarking on cross-border M&A. The results indicate that management should closely monitor the share register and identify those investors who are transient and those who are, in contrast, dedicated. Attention then needs to be directed to establishing effective communication with the dedicated investors with regional expertise